At Wisdom's Table: How Narrative Shapes the Biblical Food Laws and their Social Function
The food laws of Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20 are one of the great enigmas of biblical law. Prodigious efforts have been made since at least Philo's time to identify rationales that might provide the basis for the choice of calling some creatures clean and others unclean. 1 Yet for all the massive primary and secondary discussion, no conclusive explanation has so far emerged. 2 To aid our understanding of the mode by which the laws are expressed I propose that we see the food laws as a series of 'narrative paradigms.' 3 I argue that this reanalysis helps us to understand both the compositional I am grateful to Professor Bernard Jackson (Liverpool Hope), Professor Julian Rivers 3 "Narrative paradigm" is a technical term grounded in a variety of semiotic disciplines.
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I. A NARRATIVE APPROACH TO BIBLICAL LAW
In doing so I am building on the work of Bernard S. Jackson who has argued, persuasively in my view, that biblical law is best understood in "narrative" rather than "semantic" terms. 7 The dominant paradigm of "conventional meaning" today is "literal meaning," which is closely tied, as its name suggests, to writing. 8 A literal or "semantic" reading of any rule sees it as covering all cases that may be subsumed under the meaning of its words.
However, there is another way of thinking about language and legal rules and this is to adopt a "narrative" approach. "Narrative" meaning consists of typical stories or images that are evoked by the use of words. It arises in the context of a group that shares the social knowledge necessary to evoke those images, without needing to "spell them out. to apply or would be regarded as applicable by the audience. 10 Although Jackson himself does not make this claim, the advantage of his approach is that it takes seriously the fact that the biblical laws function in a 'high-context' society where "most of the information or message… is either in the physical context or internalised in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit transmitted part of the message." 11 Jackson's theory has been developed in relation to a specific part of the biblical legal collections, namely, the 'Covenant Code'; whether it applies more widely must be addressed on an individual basis. This raises the question of whether the biblical food laws should be regarded as 'narrative paradigms' or 'paradigm cases.' It is not an idle question. One of the most difficult aspects of the food laws has traditionally been the formulation of Deut 14:19-20 which states:
"And all winged insects are unclean for you; they shall not be eaten. Deuteronomy is later, it does not follow that just because we presume that Lev 11: [21] [22] was necessary to fill in the detail of Deut 14:20, this was also true for the audience of Deut 14:20. Indeed, the assumption that a particular law could only have made sense to the original audience if it was explicitly spelt out in another piece of legislation is a classic example of a semantic approach. We can at least raise the possibility that Deut 14:20 could make (better) sense when read narratively. In any case, it cannot be sufficient to locate the answer to the problem of Deut. 14:20 by appealing to Leviticus because similar problems are found in Lev 11 itself! For example, it is frequently noted that Lev 11:13-19 "fails to offer any criterion of edibility" 16 in regard to birds, which is to concede that Lev 11 can be as "elliptical" as Deut 14:20. This is all part of the reason for needing to move beyond a semantic reading of these texts. If we take a modern semantic approach to this case, then the drafting of verses 2 and 3 seems odd and contradictory. The first part of the rule apparently gives carte blanche to the householder who kills an intruder at any time of day or night, while the second part of the rule denies self-help if the break-in occurs during the day. However, the text makes perfect sense if we take a narrative approach and ask "what is the typical situation evoked by the words "tunnelling thief?" Even if we could not make the appropriate connections ourselves, we know from elsewhere in the biblical texts that thieves typically tunnelled into other people's houses at night (e.g. Job 24:14-16). In other words, from a narrative perspective, it is clear that the typical situation evoked by the words in Exodus 22:2 (MT 22:1) is one in which the thief tunnels at night. There is therefore no tension with the subsequent part of the rule which contrasts the legitimate action of the householder at night with the illegitimate action of the householder by day. 17 Just as the audience of Exod 22:2 supplies to the text "If the thief is seized while tunnelling at night…", so the audience of Deut 14:19 supplies "… all winged and flightless insects are unclean…." There is thus a precedent for reading Deut 14:19-20 narratively.
We thus proceed to the next step of our hypothesis. If I am on the right lines in saying that a narrative reading can make better sense of one part of the biblical food laws, the question arises whether it works for all the other categories as well. This is the focus of the next section.
II. A NARRATIVE APPROACH TO THE BIBLICAL FOOD LAWS
Scholars have occasionally noted that some verses appear to contain "principles" or "criteria" whilst other verses have "examples" and "lists." 18 However, there has not been much reflection on whether these terms adequately describe the legal reasoning at work in the texts, or even how these different elements are synthesised to produce a certain kind of sense. In my view, this is one of the most interesting features of Lev 11:3- 17 Jackson, Studies, 75-81.
18 E.g. Hartley (at 153) characterises different aspects of the composition of Lev 11:2-23 as "principles" (vv. 2b-8); "general statements without any examples" (vv. 9-12); a lack of principles (vv. 13-19) and an "initial statement" followed by "an exception" (vv. 20-23). Others such as Martin Noth observe that various categories are "differently phrased" but do not explore the matter (e.g. Leviticus, London: SCM Press, 1977, 93). 23 and Deut 14:3-20. 19 As has frequently been noted, both Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20 cover similar ground. 20 But whilst the substantive similarities between the two documents are frequently recognised, it is less commonly observed that the texts share remarkable structural similarities. In both documents some information is explicitly communicated about the creatures whilst other information is taken for granted (see Table 1 , below).
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Of course, these structural similarities could be explained on purely source critical grounds with one text being a fairly straightforward copy of the other. 21 Yet even if this is the case, we still need to account for the structure of whatever is assumed to be the prior text. Thus, despite the importance of the literary origins of the food laws, my 19 Clearly, these sections are embedded in more complex literary structures, but for reasons of space I will concentrate on these verses. My proposal is that we can understand the food laws better if we see them as examples of 'paradigm cases.' 22 We will test this hypothesis by reference to each category in turn.
(i) Land animals
First, the land animals of 
Kunin, ibid).
elements of the paradigm (i.e. hooves and chews the cud). If one element is missing, the paradigm is negated and the animal is regarded as unclean. 29 The use of hard cases thus reinforces the narrative paradigms of clean and unclean.
(ii) Aquatic creatures
Second, we turn to the aquatic creatures of Lev 11:9-12 and Deut 14:9-10. A semantic approach can be seen in Houston's claim that the sub-section on aquatic creatures is "highly redundant" 30 in Leviticus, presumably because of the lack of detail. Gerhard Von
Rad sees the aquatic creatures, as with all the categories, as drawing on earlier "lists" 31
and "catalogues" whilst Erhard S. Gerstenberger supposes that the redactor of Deut 14:9f lacked access to "more specific instructions" 32 which, he implies, would have been necessary and desirable.
A narrative approach, on the other hand, works as follows. As with the land animals, Lev 11:9 and Deut 14:9 establish the paradigm of the clean aquatic creature: "Everything in the waters that has fins and scales…" (italics added). However, unlike the land animals, 29 In Lev 11:4-7 and Deut 14:7-8 each element of the paradigm case of the clean animal is explicitly negated by the appropriate binary opposition (either "it chews the cud but does not part the hoof…"; Lev 11:6 = Deut 14:7 or "it parts the hoof and is cloven-footed but does not chew the cud…"; Lev 11:7 = Deut 14:8). 
(iii) Birds
Third, the birds, as described in 44 It may be the case that the birds are actually hard cases in the sense that, although they have feathers and fly, they don't eat what clean birds eat, and so they negate one of the key characteristics.
moves on to birds which eat fish, because they are the subject of the second category (see (ii), above). We have already noted how the 'set-up' of prior blocks of material helps to structure later information (e.g. the handling of 'hard cases' and equating clean with 'herbivorous'). The ordering of the unclean birds would thus be a further example of this internal structuring.
The bat is presumably included, and placed last, because the absence of feathers, together with its live young, means it is visually farthest from the paradigm of the clean bird. Stereotypical images are affective and draw on a range of senses including, most importantly, sight. The bat negates different characteristics of the clean bird to others on the list because although the bat eats what clean birds eat, it looks nothing like them. 45 As such, it presents the reverse problem to all the other unclean birds in the list.
(iv) Insects
Finally, the insects. The category of insects presents commentators with similar difficulties to those we have already seen for birds, in (iii) above. For Tigay "the permitted and forbidden winged animals are not distinguished by easily observable external characteristics. Hence, no general rule is given for distinguishing among them, 45 What about the hoopoe? It is further removed from the stereotypical image of the clean bird than other birds on the list because not only is it omnivorous, it also has a reputation for being particularly smelly, making its nests out of dung and rubbish.
However, it is not as far removed from the clean paradigm as the bat because it still does at least still look like a bird. A critic might object that Lev. 11:9 and Deut. 14:9 are different, given their use of the word 'all.' However, we cannot exclude the possibility of applying a narrative rather than a semantic approach even in the presence of the word ‫כל‬ ("everything"). After all, there is no reason why we should be expected to take the word ‫כל‬ literally. Even today, if reference is made in modern legislation to "all" or "everything," its meaning is quickly revised and restricted in the event of an unforeseen or atypical case. Accordingly, I
contend that we can still talk about the dietary laws in terms of 'narrative paradigms,' or 'typical images,' when -at least on the surface -they provide definitional criteria.
Before concluding this section we must acknowledge that positing a narrative approach to the biblical food laws raises certain questions about the development of legal drafting at this stage in the history of biblical law. We noted in I, above, that Jackson's conceptual model regarding biblical law and 'narrative' was developed in relation to the Mishpatim, or 'Covenant Code.' There, Jackson claims to find a relationship between narrative forms of sense construction and the oral underpinnings of the Mishpatim. 50 Jackson contends that this 'oral residue' is not completely overlaid, even when the stage of writing has been reached. 51 The question arises whether we might find examples of such oral residue outside the Mishpatim. One might suppose that a priestly work such as Leviticus would be one of the less likely places in which to find such evidence, given the 'bureaucratic mode' of the priestly genre and its particular concern for classification.
For example, the 'diagnosis' form noted by Daube, above, occurs only in Priestly sources
showing the emerging importance of classification inasmuch as "the legal consequences are impliedly derived not directly from the facts, but from the categorization of the facts as falling within an accepted legal class." 52 Indeed, Jackson himself cites Lev 11:4 as an example of the diagnosis pattern. 53 The movement from oral residue to classification could be regarded as part of a movement from one form of legal reasoning (concrete thinking) to another (abstract thought 
III. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE
Having argued that the food laws make sense as narrative paradigms which depend on 
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The criterion of vegetarianism hardly applies to herbivores which are deemed unclean, such as the rabbit. Looking, first, at the land animals, it is easy to see how, among farmers, the stereotypical image of a clean animal would be 'one that eats grass' because it is the sort of animal they have most contact with. Accordingly, herbivores will 'naturally' be seen as the 'norm.' 70 If one is developing a taxonomic system which distinguishes between clean and unclean it follows that clean animals will be herbivorous animals. 71 The narrative paradigm is typical precisely because it reflects day-to-day engagement with the environment. Indeed, the order of clean animals in Deut 14:4-5 may reflect the fact that the three kinds of edible domesticated animals ("the ox, the sheep, the goat") give rise, by association, to the seven kinds of edible wild animals ("the deer, the gazelle, the roebuck, the wild goat, the ibex, the antelope, and the mountain sheep"). the consumption of some foods and not others).
To answer this we could begin by imagining a society like ancient Israel, which has a body of social knowledge about what can and cannot be eaten, informed by the material environment. The lawgiver has the pragmatic task of finding the most effective way of communicating this to as many people as possible. The legislator could begin with some clearly-worked out paradigms (as in Lev 11 and Deut 14, in relation to land animals and aquatic creatures). But once the lawgiver has established these, the rest can be worked out quite straightforwardly. The important thing is to get the paradigm of the land animals right first (in this case, the characteristics of 'hooves and cud') and this needs to be followed by the paradigm for aquatic creatures (here, the characteristics of 'fins and scales'). The latter makes sense in light of the first category, but it is necessary to understand this as well, because the sequence builds. 87 However, once these categories are in place, the audience does not really need to think too hard about the next category (the birds), and by the time the lawgiver reaches the insects, the laws have had such an educative effect, that, by the end of this category, the audience can even cope with an exception. The economy is breathtaking. As a way of transmitting knowledge, it is extremely effective.
In terms of what is actually 'posited' in the food laws, the only arbitrary element 88 is the first clear statement regarding clean and unclean land animals and the second statement regarding aquatic creatures. This is why most attention is paid to these 87 Cf. Houston who claims that the sub-section on aquatic creatures is "highly redundant" in Leviticus (Purity, 40). 95 The brilliance of the food laws is how they strike a balance between the need to be edible and straightforward, matching, so far as possible, normal eating practice and hallowing the mundane. The food laws do not therefore present themselves as fictional or utopian. On the contrary, they consist of a rationalising structure of paradigm cases and binary oppositions which is pragmatic and easy to teach.
In this way, the entire substantial content and compositional strategy of the biblical food laws can be seen as an exercise and an education in practical wisdom. Their genius is that they are so practically useful. Their didactic strength is such that the audience can reel off any creature and be able to tell, instantly, whether it is clean or 'unclean.' 96 law, which are concerned with mediating practical wisdom, I believe it is not correct to claim that these texts are immune from wisdom influence. 95 The designation of paradigm clean creatures could well have been broader than cultural practice. Donkeys, apparently, were clean, though there is no particular reason to think people in biblical Israel ate them. E.g. Meshel, "Pure, Impure, Permitted, Prohibited", 32-42 avers "it is doubtful that Lev 11 ever served as a normative basis for Israelite society at any given historical period"
(here at 39, italics added).
accounts for the boundaries of the different categories because they reflect paradigmatic social knowledge. Fourth, it explains the content of the food laws by connecting each category to non-structural materialist and economic concerns. Fifth, it explains the presence of 'false negatives' as a necessary trade-off between breadth of diet and clear teaching whilst, finally, it is consistent with other biblical laws which are rooted in practical wisdom.
V. CONCLUSION
The food laws of Leviticus and Deuteronomy have a different rationalising structure to modern law. Although from a semantic perspective they strike us as vacuous, elliptical and incomplete, my alternative reading contends that the biblical food laws target typical or paradigmatic cases aimed at a high-context society in which information is shared and internalised. This shared social knowledge raises the question of how the common environment of ancient Israel would make the categories intuitively clear. The laws take the form of narrative paradigms which make sense because they reflect dayto-day engagement with the environment. The paradigm cases identify certain characteristics of a taxonomic group, which are then negated. The effect is to impart a complex body of knowledge about what can and cannot be eaten in an economical, unambiguous and practical manner. The laws build on each other, enabling the audience to accumulate knowledge as they progress through the different categories. In this way, the very construction of the categories clean and unclean -and hence the structure and presentation of the laws themselves -is shaped by practical wisdom.
They enable people to make firm distinctions based on visual images which can be easily applied, at a popular level. This is consistent with self-executing narrative rules elsewhere in biblical law. 
